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he stated purpose of the Southern Methodist University Law Re-
view's Annual Survey of Texas Law is to provide Texas practition-
ers with a "'thoughtful, critical, analysis and synthesis of important
cases and statutes in the major fields of Texas jurisprudence."" This Arti-
cle is aimed at achieving that goal in the area of construction law, and, to
that end, discusses some of the more important-and hopefully interest-
ing-cases and statutes presented during the course of the Survey period.
* Robert L. Meyers, III received both his undergraduate (B.A. 1958) and his law
degree (LLB 1960) from Southern Methodist University. He is a partner in the Dallas
office of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue and has concentrated his practice on construction
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Dallas office of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue and concentrates his practice in the areas of
construction law, construction documentation, and commercial real estate development.
He has written for and participated in the presentation of various programs concerning
construction law, including Practicing Law Institute's Construction Contracts Seminars, the
Texas Bar Advanced Real Estate Program, and the ABA/Joint Program on bankruptcy in
the Construction Industry. Mr. Albers is a contributing author to the following books pub-
lished by John Wiley & Sons: CONSTRUCrION FAILURES (1989), PROVING AND PRICING
CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS (1990) and FIRTY STATE CONSTRucIoN LIEN AND BOND LAW
(1992).
1. Annual Survey of Texas Law, Policies, Procedures, and Guidelines, SMU Law Re-
view Association (quoting former SMU Law School Dean Charles 0. Galvin) (on file with
the SMU Law Review Association).
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I. MECHANICS' LIENS
The Houston Court of Appeals confirmed and clarified certain issues
regarding rights and remedies in connection with the enforcement of
mechanics' liens in Hadnot v. WENCO Distributors.2 The Hadnot case
affirmed a trial court judgment in favor of the subcontractor claimants
against the owner for a money judgment, as well as foreclosure of their
timely filed mechanics' lien claims.3 In analyzing the claims and the de-
fenses raised, the court clarified the law with respect to the sources of
funds available to subcontractors and suppliers who have not been paid.
The court, citing First National Bank v. Sledge,4 identified two distinct
sources of funds to which derivative claimants (i.e., subcontractors and
suppliers) may look to recover from the owner.5 The first of these is the
"statutory retainage fund."'6 The second is the "trapped funds."'7 The
statutory retainage fund represents ten percent of the contract price to
the owner, and must be retained during performance of the work and for
thirty days after the work is complete. 8 In order to have a lien against the
statutory retainage fund, the claimant must (1) send notices required by
the applicable provisions of the Texas Property Code and (2) file an affi-
davit of lien not later than thirty days after the work is complete.9 The
court held that in the event that the owner fails to comply with the
amount and duration of the statute's ten percent retainage requirement, a
claimant satisfying its obligations under section 53.103 has a lien "at least
to the extent of the amount that should have been retained from the orig-
inal contract under which they are claiming.' 10 The court held that where
the owner does not retain the ten percent, the thirty day period for filing
the affidavit of lien is inapplicable, and the owner becomes personally
liable to the claimant."
The trapped funds represent amounts otherwise payable to the original
(general) contractor by the owner which a claimant can "trap" in the
owner's hands by giving the owner notice of non-payment.' 2 The court
affirmed the personal liability of the owner and that of its property to
derivative claimants if and to the extent that the owner pays "any money
to the general contractor after receiving notice from the claimants.' 13
At issue in Hadnot was the interpretation of the requirement under
2. 961 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] April 10, 1997, no writ).
3. See id. at *1.
4. 653 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1983).
5. See Hadnot, 961 S.W.2d at 234.
6. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.101-53.106 (Vernon 1995).
7. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.081-53.085 (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 1998). It
should be noted that although the court refers to such sums as "trapped retainage," such is
not limited to statutory retainage. See Hadnot, 961 S.W.2d at 235.
8. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.101 (Vernon 1995).
9. See id. § 53.103.
10. Hadnot, 961 S.W.2d at 234.
11. See id. at 235.
12. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.081 (Vernon 1995).




section 53.084 that "the claim has been reduced to final judgment."'1 4 The
court rejected the owner's contention that the subcontractors and suppli-
ers must first obtain a final judgment against the general contractor to
support their lien claims.15 The lien claims have their basis in the
mechanics' lien statute, and the validity of the amounts due was estab-
lished at trial. 16 The court held that the language at issue relates to the
establishment and foreclosure of the lien, which may occur only upon the
judgment of a court and not through self-enforcement as in the case of
deeds of trust.17 The property in question in this case was the homestead
of the Hadnots, but that was not a factor in the court's determination
inasmuch as the Hadnots had entered into a mechanics' lien contract for
the construction of their home.
II. NO DAMAGES FOR DELAY
In Green International, Inc. v. Solis,' 8 the Texas Supreme Court upheld
the enforceability of a no-damage-for-delay clause in a construction sub-
contract. The contractual provision at issue in Green provided: "Con-
tractor [Green] .. .shall not be liable to the Subcontractor [Solis] for
delay to Subcontractor's work by the act, neglect or default of the Owner,
Contractor, action of workmen or others, or any cause beyond Contrac-
tor's control."'19 First, the Court acknowledged that Texas recognizes
four exceptions to the enforcement of no-damage-for-delay clauses: (1)
delays not intended or contemplated to be within the provision; (2) those
resulting from fraud, misrepresentation, or bad faith; (3) delays of such
unreasonable duration as to permit abandoning the contract; and (4)
those not within the specifically enumerated delays to which the clause
applies.20 Second, the Court rejected the appellate court's conclusion
that an additional exception, active interference, applied.2'
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Court rejected the subcon-
tractor's argument that the no-damage-for-delay clause should be subject
to the conspicuousness requirement applicable to indemnity provisions.
22
The Court noted that its prior decision in Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page
Petroleum, Inc. 23 was "explicitly limited to releases and indemnity clauses
in which one party exculpates itself from its own future negligence.
'24
The Court distinguished Dresser as a case concerned with shifting tort
and negligence damages, whereas no-damage-for-delay clauses shift eco-
14. Id. § 53.084(b).
15. See Hadnot, 961 S.W.2d at 236.
16. See id.
17. See id.; TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.154 (Vernon 1995).
18. 951 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Tex. 1997).
19. Id. at 387.
20. See id. (citing City of Houston v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 570 S.W.2d 75 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.)).
21. See id. at 388.
22. See id. at 387.
23. 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993).
24. Green, 951 S.W.2d at 387.
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nomic damages resulting from a breach of contract. 25 Practitioners,
whether seeking to avoid or enforce the application of a no-damage-for-
delay clause, should carefully read the Court's opinion on these issues.
The Court also extended the no-damage-for-delay clause bar to conse-
quential damages such as, in this case, damage to credit reputation.26
Also of note is the Court's determination that the mere signing of interim
lien releases does not act as a bar to a claim for extra contractual work, as
has been held in some other jurisdictions.2 7 The Court's reasoning is ap-
parently based upon the conclusion that the releases were not fully opera-
tive until the ten percent retainage had been paid, i.e., the lien releases
were in exchange for one hundred percent payment, not ninety percent,
and because certain change orders had been executed following the exe-
cution of lien releases.28 This reasoning is somewhat questionable, but
the result obviously tries to do justice in recognition of the economic real-
ities related to progress payments.
III. PROJECT SAFETY
The Eastland Court of Appeals addressed the issue of responsibility for
project safety in the case of Graham v. Freese & Nichols, Inc.2 9 In this
case, the employee of a general contractor sued the engineering firm that,
by contract, had designed the project and had on site contract administra-
tion responsibility. Suit was for work site injury sustained by the general
contractor's employee. The court reasoned that responsibility for job site
safety could arise by contract or by conduct. 30 The court held that the
engineering firm had no contractual duty for job site safety, that job site
safety was the contractual duty of the general contractor, and that the
engineer exercised no control over the premises. 31
IV. FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
During the past year, both the San Antonio Court of Appeals and the
Houston Court of Appeals have had an opportunity to discuss the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act 32 and related issues as they apply to construction
disputes. The Houston court issued an opinion in Hou-Scape, Inc. v.
Lloyd.33 In this case, a subcontractor was seeking confirmation of the
arbitration award it obtained against the general contractor. The general
contractor in turn was seeking to have the award vacated and sought a
mandamus to compel the trial court to order arbitration of not only the
contract in which the arbitration provision was contained, but related tort
25. See id.
26. See id. at 388.
27. See id. at 389.
28. See id.
29. 927 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1996, writ denied).
30. See id. at 296.
31. See id.
32. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-14, 201-207 (1994).
33. 945 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
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claims as well. The Houston court held, among other things, that the re-
quest for confirmation was not ripe because of the pending motion to
vacate the same award.34 In addition, the court held that the subcontrac-
tor's verified motion alleging that the goods it provided pursuant to the
contract were in interstate commerce and the payment and performance
bonds it had obtained, which were issued in the State of New York, were
sufficient to support application of the Federal Arbitration Act. 35 The
court cited a number of cases in support of this holding, not including,
unfortunately, one of the leading cases on this issue: Blanks v. Midstate
Constructors, Inc.36 Having found the Federal Arbitration Act applica-
ble, the court determined that federal law controls whether or not the
ancillary counterclaims were arbitrable, and that the applicable standard
is that arbitration "should not be denied unless it can be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpreta-
tion that covers the asserted dispute. '' 37 Further, the court held that in
determining this issue, the facts alleged, as opposed to the causes of ac-
tion asserted, were to be reviewed. 38 The court determined that the tort
counterclaims actually arose out of the alleged failure of the subcontrac-
tor to fulfill its contractual obligations, and therefore, they were arbitra-
ble.39 Interestingly, the tort claims in question included violation of the
DTPA,40 fraudulent inducement, defamation, and tortious interference.
In Hardin Construction Group, Inc. v. Strictly Painting, Inc.,41 the
San Antonio Court of Appeals considered a case wherein the subcontrac-
tor sued the contractor on estoppel, fraud, quantum meruit, and lien
claims. The general contractor sought to compel arbitration, but the trial
court denied its motion. The contractor filed both an interlocutory ap-
peal under the Texas Arbitration Act 42 and a motion seeking mandamus
to direct the trial court to order arbitration. The court held that the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act applied because both the general contractor and the
subcontractor were based in Georgia, the construction project was in
Texas, the subcontractor retained the services of Texas and Alabama sub-
contractors, employees were hired in Georgia for the Texas project, and
supplies were purchased by a subcontractor in Texas.43 The court held
that these facts were sufficient to cause the contract containing the arbi-
tration clause to be "relat[ed] to interstate commerce. '44
Having determined this threshold issue, the court then held that the
interlocutory appeal was inappropriate because the Federal Arbitration
34. See id. at 204.
35. See id. at 205.
36. 610 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37. Hou-Scape, 945 S.W.2d at 205.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.01 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1998).
41. 945 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, app. for mand. filed).
42. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.001-171.098 (Vernon 1997).




Act, rather than the Texas Arbitration Act, applied, and the court sus-
tained the request for mandamus applying the abuse of discretion test.45
V. DELAY DAMAGES
In Chilton Insurance Company v. Pate & Pate Enterprises, Inc.,46 the
San Antonio Court of Appeals dealt with an array of construction issues,
but the principal issues involved a claim for extended home office over-
head by reason of delay and, secondarily, issues of judicial admissions,
the nature of McGregor Act 47 claims, and the doctrine of quantum me-
ruit as applied to construction disputes.
With respect to home office overhead as an element of delay damage,
the court seemed to recognize the validity of overhead claims related to
delay arising out of the breach of a construction contract. The court ana-
lyzed such claims as being extended home office overhead and unab-
sorbed home office overhead. 48 Extended home office overhead was
defined as the additional cost for the period of extension of job comple-
tion, while unabsorbed home office overhead was home office overhead
not deferred by the cash flow generated by the construction contract rev-
enue stream in a timely manner.49 It is not clear which of these types of
home office overhead the court considered, but apparently the court ac-
cepted both as valid forms of damage. The court also recognized the use
of the "Eichleay Formula,"50 which is a formula often used in cases
before the United States Contract Board of Appeals for calculating ex-
tended home office overhead costs. However, an evidentiary quirk effec-
tively barred recovery for the subcontractor claimant in this case. The
court held that while the conclusory testimony of the contractor's presi-
dent, as to the fact that some additional overhead was incurred, was suffi-
cient in general, it was not sufficient to tie those damages to the surety
inasmuch as these delays could not be attributed or allocated to delays
occurring after the surety took over performance obligations. 51 The court
did not reach the issue of whether the surety would nevertheless be re-
sponsible for the obligations of its principal in that regard.
In addition, the court confirmed that the McGregor Act does not cre-
ate an independent cause of action but is simply a statutory means of
enforcing other claims.52
With respect to the quantum meruit claims, the court confirmed the
general rule that quantum meruit cannot be asserted or sustained if there
is a contract covering the same performance requirements. 53 The court,
45. See id.
46. 930 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
47. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 2253.001-2253.079 (Vernon 1997).
48. See Chilton, 930 S.W.2d at 892.
49. See id.
50. See Eichleay Corp., ASBCA No. 5183, 60-2 BCA 2688 (1960).
51. See Chilton, 930 S.W.2d at 893.
52. See id. at 886.
53. See id. at 889.
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moreover, confirmed the exception available in construction contracts
where the owner or general contractor has received the benefit of the
performance by the contractor or subcontractor and quantum meruit the-
ory is allowed to prevent unjust enrichment. 54
VI. STATUTES OF REPOSE
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals recently addressed certain issues
relating to the ten year statute of repose applicable to claims of those who
furnish construction or repair of improvements to real property.55 In
Gordon v. Western Steel Co.,56 the court reconfirmed that the ten-year
period commences upon substantial completion of the improvement, irre-
spective of the date on which the damage or injury complained of is dis-
covered.57 The court also concluded, in a more finely tuned analysis, that
with respect to subcontractors, the ten-year period of repose began to run
on the date when their portion of the improvement was substantially
complete.58 This point is of particular interest to subcontractor trades,
which normally finish early in the construction process. Addressing the
sufficiency of summary judgment evidence, the court determined that un-
contradicted evidence presented by subcontractors, in the form of affida-
vits and verified receipts for payment of work demonstrating that the
particular subcontractor's work had been in fact substantially completed
more than ten years prior to the filing of the action, was sufficient to
support summary judgment.59
VII. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
ADMINISTRATIVE AWARDS
In Texas Department of Transportation v. T. Brown Constructors, Inc.,60
the Austin Court of Appeals reviewed an administrative award made by
the Texas Department of Transportation (DOT), presumably pursuant to
the internal review and "arbitration" provisions governing claims against
the Texas DOT. In this case, the Texas DOT awarded the contractor
$56,295 on its various claims, after which the contractor filed suit to set
aside this award and to recover the $3 million it had sought. The district
court in Austin set aside the administrative award as grossly inadequate,
and instead substituted a judgment in the amount of $3,318,001.33. The
procedural record is a bit confusing inasmuch as the Texas DOT failed to
appeal the district court judgment but subsequently filed a bill of review
seeking to set it aside. After moving through various procedural matters,
the court of appeals concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to re-
54. See id.
55. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.008, 16.009 (Vernon 1986 & Supp.
1998).
56. 950 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied).
57. See id. at 746.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 749.
60. 947 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. denied).
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view and set aside administrative awards that in the court's view were
inadequate and to direct that the administrative agency award an appro-
priate amount.61 However, the court held that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to determine on its own the appropriate amount of the
award.62 The reasoning was that the Legislature specifically granted to
the Texas DOT and agencies with similar procedures the authority and
discretion to determine the appropriate amount to award with respect to
claims.63 The result of this opinion, though probably correct on the law,
creates a practical problem. The claimant contractor in Brown could go
back to the Texas DOT and receive another award, theoretically, in the
amount of $100,000, file suit to set that award aside, have the trial court
once again set aside the award, and go back again to the Texas DOT until
such time as the Texas DOT should arrive at an award that is either satis-
factory to the contractor or close enough to the court's idea of the appro-
priate award to pass muster. This could in theory take an infinite number
of trips to the Texas DOT and to the district court, back and forth, but
presumably this is one of the practical problems that can arise when ap-
plying the separation of powers doctrine to bolster the discretionary au-
thority of administrative agencies. Hopefully, such a procedural
nightmare can be avoided by the application of the "cooler heads" doc-
trine following a singular and somewhat mutually frustrating trip to the
courthouse.
VIII. TEXAS PROPERTY CODE
The Survey period also witnessed material changes to the Texas
mechanics' and materialmen's lien statutes.64 This Article does not dis-
cuss the subsequent changes to Texas law regarding Texas home equity
loans, which occurred after the Survey period, or their potential effects on
homestead and mechanics' and materialmen's lien statutes.
A detailed discussion of Texas lien law could easily be the subject of an
article dedicated exclusively to that topic. For the present purposes, this
Article will focus on the two major additions to chapter 53 of the Texas
Property Code: (1) removal and revival of liens, and (2) residential con-
struction projects.
Section 17 of chapter 53 has been substantially expanded by the addi-
tion of the three new sections dealing with "Summary Motion to Remove
Invalid or Unenforceable Lien," "Bond Requirements After Order to
Remove," and "Revival of Removed Lien."'65 Section 53.160 provides
that in a suit to foreclose a lien, a party objecting to the validity or en-
forceability of the lien may now file a verified motion to remove the lien
61. See id. at 658.
62. See id. at 659.
63. See id.
64. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.160-53.162, 53.251-53.260 (Vernon 1995 & Supp.
1998).
65. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.160, 53.161, 53.162 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
[Vol. 51
CONSTRUCTION LAW
or claim.66 The grounds for objecting to the lien's validity are specifically
limited to situations where (1) the claimant fails to furnish statutory no-
tices required to the owner or original contractor; (2) the lien affidavit
fails to comply with the statutorily required elements or was not properly
filed; (3) the claimant fails to furnish notice of the filed lien affidavit to
the owner or original contractor; (4) the owner has complied with all
retainage requirements and paid all funds to the original contractor
before the claimant perfects its lien and before the owner receives notice
of the claim; (5) the owner has deposited the sums claimed with the court;
or (6) the claimant has executed a valid waiver or release. 67 In those
instances where the property is the homestead, the fact that the contract
was not signed or filed as required by statute, or that either the lien or the
notice of claim did not contain its requisite statutory notice, are also ac-
cepted grounds for objection.68
The lien claimant has the burden to prove that he furnished notice of
the claim and the lien affidavit to the owner and original contractor; the
party objecting to the lien has the burden of proof as to any other
grounds for removal. 69 No interlocutory appeal of the court's order is
permitted, 70 nor is the court's order admissible as evidence in the trial of
the case.71
Removal of the lien may be stayed if the claimant posts bond, cash, or
security in an amount, determined by the court, sufficient to cover the
movant's estimated costs and attorneys' fees in proceeding to determine
the lien's validity within thirty days after the order is entered.72 Absent
the foregoing stay, the owner may file the order with a certificate of the
court clerk stating that no bond was filed and no order of stay was en-
tered.73 The lien is removed and extinguished as to a creditor or subse-
quent purchaser who obtains an interest in the property after the filing of
the order and the clerk's certificate with the county clerk.74 The removal
of the lien does not, however, constitute a release of the owner's liability,
if any, to the claimant. 75 Additionally, if the claimant obtains a final judg-
ment in the case which establishes the validity of the lien and ordering its
foreclosure, the claimant may file the judgment, and the lien is then re-
vived.76 The lien, even though "revived," is void as to a creditor or subse-
quent purchaser who obtained an interest in the property after the order
of removal and the clerk's certificate were filed with the county clerk, but
66. See id. § 53.160.
67. See id. § 53.160(b)(1)-(5), (7).
68. See id. § 53.160(b)(6). These statutory requirements are hereinafter discussed in
connection with "Residential Construction Projects."
69. See id. § 53.160(d).
70. See id. § 53.160(e).
71. See id. § 53.160(f).
72. See id. § 53.161.
73. See id.
74. See id. § 53.161(g).
75. See id.
76. See id. § 53.162.
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before the final judgment reviving the lien was so filed. 77
The procedures under sections 53.160-162 offer a means of more expe-
ditiously addressing lien claims and may prove dispositive in those in-
stances where the lien is clearly invalid or spurious. While it also offers a
procedural mechanism for clearing title and protecting lenders and pur-
chasers, it is not the simplified means of fully resolving the owner's dis-
pute with lien claimants that one might assume.
Subchapter K-"Residential Construction Projects"78-has also been
added to the Texas Property Code, and while nominally a mechanics' and
materialmen's statute, it has the overtone of a consumer protection act.
Sections 53.251 to 53.253 set forth the statutory notice procedures appli-
cable to perfecting a lien claim and to trapping funds on residential con-
struction projects, which are similar and in many instances identical to
those applicable to non-residential projects.79 Section 53.254 contains
special requirements when the residential construction project is Texas
homestead property. 80 The inclusion of these provisions in section 53.254
does not represent a revision in Texas lien or homestead law; rather, sec-
tion 53.254 is a recodification of former section 53.059 (which was re-
pealed when section 53.254 was added). Sections 53.255 to 53.259 have
been added to chapter 53 of the Property Code to establish and clarify to
owners, lenders, and potential lien claimants the disclosures that must be
made to the owner in connection with residential construction projects. 81
Section 53.255 contains the specific requirements of the disclosure state-
ment that the original contractor is required to give to the owner prior to
the owner's signing a residential construction contract. 82 The required
disclosure statement is a detailed twelve paragraph construction primer
for the uninitiated and unwary, an explanation of do(s) and don't(s) rang-
ing from "GET IT IN WRITING" to "SOME CLAIMS MAY NOT BE
VALID,' 83 all of which, despite complaints about the provisions' length
and excessive discussion of items non-laymen will consider obvious,
would be helpful and useful if parties were more likely to utilize it. The
section, however, provides that the failure to comply with its require-
ments does not invalidate a mechanics' lien, contract lien, or deed of
77. See id. § 53.162(c).
78. See id. §§ 53.251-53.260. As used in the statute, "residence" is "a single-family
house, duplex, triplex, or quadruplex or a unit in a multiunit structure used for residential
purposes that is: (A) owned by one or more adult persons; and (B) used or intended to be
used as a dwelling by one of the owners." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.001(8) (Vernon
Supp. 1998). "Residential construction project" is "a project for the construction or repair
of a new or existing residence, including improvements appurtenant to the residence ..
Id. § 53.001(10).
79. One important difference is the requirement under section 53.052(b) that the lien
on residential construction be filed by the fifteenth day of the third calendar month after
indebtedness accrues, instead of the customary fourth month. Another is that suits to fore-
close must be brought under section 53.158(b) within one year after lien filing rather than
the customary two years. See id. §§ 53.052(b), 53.158.
80. See id. § 53.254.
81. See id. §§ 53.255-53.259.




trust.84 Section 53.256 requires attachment of a list of project subcontrac-
tors and suppliers to the foregoing disclosure statement and the updating
of the list within fifteen days after the addition or removal of a subcon-
tractor or supplier.85 As with the disclosure statement itself, failure to
comply does not invalidate any liens. 86
The "Residential Construction Projects" provisions also require the
lender, where the owner is borrowing residential construction financing,
to provide to the owner all loan closing documents not later than one day
before closing, and to provide the aforementioned disclosure statement
before closing (or at closing for good cause and with the owner's written
consent).8 7 Here again, lack of compliance does not invalidate liens or
deeds of trust.88 Section 53.258 further requires that the original contrac-
tor, and the lender if there is third-party financing, furnish the owner with
signed statements of construction billings, expenses, and disbursements,
and that the lender do so prior to disbursing funds to the original contrac-
tor.89 While failure to comply with these requirements does not invali-
date liens or deeds of trust, the act of intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly providing false or misleading information is a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of up to $4,000 and a jail term of up to one year. 90
Delivery to the owner by the original contractor of an affidavit of all bills
paid is made a condition of final payment in residential construction
projects. 91 The seller of residential construction that is intended by the
purchaser to be its residence is required to provide the purchaser with a
similar affidavit.92 The same misdemeanor penalties previously refer-
enced apply here as well, and the affiant is personally liable for any loss
or damage resulting from any "false or incorrect information in the
affidavit."'93
84. See id. § 53.255(c).
85. See id. § 53.256(a).
86. See id. § 53.256(c).
87. See id. § 53.257.
88. See id. § 53.257(c).
89. See id. § 53.258.
90. See id. § 53.258(f).
91. See id. § 53.259(a).
92. See id. § 53.259(b).
93. Id. § 53.259(d) (The provision does not require that the false or incorrect informa-
tion be furnished intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly for the personal liability to apply).
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